A basic theme of this paper is the idea that some structural reform of employee compensation arrangements is necessary to make reasonable price stability compatible with reasonably full employment. In this view even the best designed macroeconomic policies are much too aggregative to get at the heart of the stagflation problem. The ultimate solution involves going inside the workings of a modern capitalist economy and correcting the underlying structural flaw directly on the level of the individual firm.
Consider a typical monopolistically competitive firm operating under a more general labour compensation formula than is ordinarily treated in conventional theory.
Let Zi be some economic indicator pertinent to firm i. Typical candidates might include price of output, profit per worker, or revenue per worker. (Other interpretations, including economy wide variables, are not excluded.)
Let Ai stand for a contract parameter, whose value is treated as parameterising a quasi-fixed compensation contract in the short run, although it is ultimately determined by the long run forces of bargaining in a competitive labour market.
For expository simplicity Ai and Zi are both treated as scalars; the extension to a vector formulation is routine.
The compensation function Wi = Fi (Ai) Zi) (I ) is a formula describing the monetary remuneration of a worker as a function of the slow-moving contract parameter Ai and the fast moving current performance indicator Zi. Throughout this paper theform of the contract Fi(Ai, Z1) is treated as exogenously given for each firm i, while contract parameter values Ai are endogenously fixed by long term competitive forces. In other words, Fi(Ai, Zj) represents a class of admissible contracts, with Ai parameterising a specific member of the class. That the {F,(Ai, Zj)} are treated as given reflects the purpose of this paper: to explore the economic ramifications of postulating various contract forms. I do not have a formal theory which would explain why a particular firm should behaviourally limit itself to one class or another of admissible contracts; presumably, though, the analysis of this paper is necessary anyway as a preliminary step toward addressing that larger issue. For analytic convenience and without much loss of generality, it is assumed that: A set of compensation contracts {Fi (Ai, Zj) }, one for each firm i in the economy, defines a compensation system. It is easiest at first to think of the system as exogenously determined by the given functional forms (I). Then, later, a focal point of the analysis will be to compare the macroeconomic behaviour of alternative 766 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [DECEMBER compensation systems by examining the consequences of assuming different compensation functions. This seems the appropriate methodology for a paper whose aim is limited to describing the implications of alternative contract forms without yet attempting the grand historical synthesis of explaining why they actually evolved. One particular case of a compensation function is the traditional money wage, which is independent of firm performance and can therefore be written in the special form Fi (Ai, Z*) = Ai.
In the general case a compensation function may typically depend on Zi, so that aFi~~~~~~~~~~~~ OFi > o.
az.
For the product wage, Zi in (i) represents the price of the firm's output, or more generally some price index of its outputs. The 'sliding scale' of the early iron and steel industry is a good example of a product wage. Throughout history, output prices have been sporadically included in wage formulas for coal miners, textile workers, and workers in other industries.' In this paper the pure product wage of the form F (A ,Zi) = Ai Zi (6) with Zi the price of output, can serve as a simple prototype example of a non-wage compensation function. For the case of profit sharing, Z, would represent some measure of profits per worker. In good years many Japanese firms may pay up to five months or more of blue collar compensation in the form of a semi-annual profit sharing bonus. As will be shown, it is no coincidence that such a system goes along with job security and low unemployment.2 Under revenue sharing, Z* would stand for the value of output per worker. Various commission systems pay employees by this formula, as do sharecropping arrangements. Many industrial gain-sharing plans (Scanlon, Rucker, Improshare) augment wages by some fraction of the value of plant shipments per unit of labour. Some form of revenue sharing by the firm is arguably the most practical scheme for linking wages to current performance in a modern capitalist economy.
Many other examples of compensation functions could be given. (Note, for instance, that any weighted average of compensation functions is also a compensation function.) While various labour remuneration shemes may superficially appear to be non-comparable with each other, this paper will emphasise a generic dichotomy (into 'wages' and 'shares') based on common abstract properties.
1 See, for example, Schloss (I892). 2 Of course, I do not mean to imply that the bonus system alone is responsible for Japan's stellar economic performance. The opposite extreme, that profit sharing has nothing to do with the low Japanese unemployment rate, strikes me as equally implausible. Okuno (I982) contains a good description of the basic features of what he calls the 'output-related wage system', by which he means 'income of corporate employees does (or at least is believed to, in worker's perception) depend upon corporate performance'.
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It is important to realise that there is nothing sacrosanct about the functional form (4). A traditional money wage system is a particularly simple example of (i) which happens to have historically evolved in certain places at certain times, but does not cry out with compelling logical or theoretical claims to priority.' Actually, as will be shown, a money wage system has comparatively bad macroeconomic properties. By contrast, a system based on (5) can possess good stagflation resisting qualities.
In this paper all uncertainty is embodied in a vector of shift parameters A, representing various exogenously specified economic states.2 Some components might be specific to the firm while others could pertain to the general economy. For the time being A is treated as a fixed constant. Later it will be suddenly changed to model the effects of unanticipated shocks.
Labour is treated as a uniform, homogeneous, freely substitutable factor. It is important to realise that, given the state of the world, the amount of labour Li which firm i chooses to hire determines, indirectly, the performance indicator Zi by some transformation function Zi = G, (Li; A).
For example, in a product wage system where Zi represents the price of commodity i, Li is transformed into Zi via production and demand functions. The reader should be able to see that an analogous argument applies to the other examples of compensation systems which have been discussed.
Substituting ( 
It is formula (8) which describes the basic underlying short term relation between compensation and employment in the firm, given quasi-fixed values of the contract parameter and the shift parameters. If not for an interest in motivating the reader by providing concrete examples, the analysis could just as well 1 As will become apparent, I do not subscribe to the (tautological) philosophy that every existing economic convention, institution, or contract must have a raison d'6tre in terms of economic theory. To explain everything this way is to turn economic theory into a game which explains nothing. When it comes to system wide socio-economic conventions, good economic theory can sometimes be used to provide legitimate ahistorical explanations, but the pure inertia of social tradition is a strong independent force which discourages tampering with any institution that 'works'. As a general rule, structural change is possible in such situations only when it becomes unavoidably obvious that the system is not performing very well and an experimental attitude has been actuated by the appearance of a more promising alternative. Here is a contemporary example. Granting some exceptions, it is a fair generalisation that the predominant mortgage contract form in the United States is the fixed rate, while the variable rate mortgage is standard in the United Kingdom and Canada. Differences in risk aversion, moral hazard, adverse selection, asymmetric information, transaction costs, or the like do not adequately explain the stubborn persistence over many centuries of different mortgage forms between two such similar countries as the United States and Canada. The explanation lies not in new buzzwords of economic theory, but rather in history, tradition, and inertia. It is only after the onslaught of historically unprecedented levels of interest rates that some few U.S. banks even begin to experiment with variable rate mortgages. In this paper the short run is viewed as a state of less-than-full equilibrium where some incompletely adjusted variables are essentially treated as quasi-fixed parameters, while other variables are allowed to change freely. Of course this formulation exaggerates the real world. It is analytically useful because it captures sharply how disequilibrium behaviour depends in a fundamental way upon assumptions about relative speeds of adjustment. In my opinion the relevant assumption is that Ai is stickier than Li even though both change gradually due to real world frictions and inertias. Compensation parameters are determined by long run competitive forces while the employer specifies the employment level in the short run, given the existing labour contract. I think of the firm as negotiating Ai once a year, but selecting Li once a month. In the short run almost any negotiated contract parameter is bound to stick to whatever defines it, while the firm first reacts to shocks by adjusting other variables. After all, by its very nature a compensation contract is a quasi-stable function (of Li and A) telling workers how they are to be paid throughout some protracted period. Since Ai represents the contract itself (within a certain class), it is natural to think of Ai as being fixed in the short run.
Leaving aside the important but separate issue of whether or not labour contract stickiness can be adequately explained on some deeper level, the remainder of the paper explores the implications of assuming, ad hoc, that compensation parameters are quasi-fixed in the short run.2 From the perspective of this paper, the relevant issue is neither to justify nor to contest the fact of a sticky I The net revenue product function is a partial equilibrium concept which depends, among other things, upon production functions, demand curves for outputs, supply curves of non-labour inputs, reactions of other firms, factor payment disbursements, etc. all taken as given at the full employment equilibrium position. The theory of monopolistic competition rests on an implicit postulate that the firm's market situation can be summarised by a well defined demand or revenue function. Although a complete, fully consistent, rigorous general equilibrium formulation is not yet available except for very special cases, I nevertheless believe the 'as if' monopolistic competition story is the best simple approximation to a usuable theory of real world markets currently available.
2 So far as I can see, few basic economic principles are actually at stake in choosing relative adjustment speeds out of equilibrium. To me, implicit contract theory is an imaginative, even ingenious, way of construing what appears to be short run disequilibrium as part of a consistent long run stochastic equilibrium (see, e.g. Azariadis (I98I), Baily (I974), Hart (I983), Azariadis and Stiglitz (I983), Akerlof and Miyazaki (2 980)); but it does seem as if a purposeful use of it, along with the appropriate assumptions, can be made to rationalise almost any adjustment story. Despite some overlap, the spirit of this paper is quite different from the typical implicit contract approach. In conventional implicit contract theory all disturbances are forseen as risks and are incorporated into the equilibrium contract between the firm and its particular pool of workers. (It typically makes no sense, e.g. to inquire what would happen if the labour force unexpectedly increased and a new worker not covered by any contract showed up at the firm's doorstep looking for work.) This paper attempts to address the issue of how a system reacts to uncertain or unforseen shocks which take it out of a state of long run equilibrium.
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[DECEMBER labour contract, but to use it in choosing a compensation system with good disequilibrium properties.' Suppose, then, that contract parameters are fixed in the short run but quantities and product prices are allowed to vary. Let S be the supply of labour. For expositional simplicity S is treated as an exogenously fixed constant, although it is not difficult to extend the analysis to cover the case of a more general supply function. In the more general case S would be written as a function S( W, {Pj}; A) of labour income W and product prices {PF}, as well as of A.
Let 
That condition (20) represents the appropriate allocation of labour in an unemployment state should be obvious.
In regime I, any short run equilibrium {Li} satisfies Li <,
Li= o<L= Wi4(Ai,,Li) <) W,
o < Li < 4 7, (24) Li Li=:rWi(AX,i) 1> T11) (25) 1 Since I am going to argue that a share system is ' better' than a wage system when both compensation parameters are sticky, a share parameter which is more flexible than a wage parameter would only strengthen my case.
2 Actually, complete labour substitutability is not really required in this paper. A more limited 'overlapping substitutability' between partially segmented labour markets is enough. It suffices to have labour perfectly substitutable only between 'neighbouring' firms i and i+ i. The paper treats labour contracts as if synchronous. With 'overlapping substitutability' of labour, the same idea works for staggered contracts. Consider a hypothetical benchmark state of long run stationary equilibrium. The shift parameter A has been fixed at the same value for a long time and, while no one expects it to remain there forever, the possible changes are too vague or uncertain to be seriously reckoned. People are projecting an existing, stable situation into the future. Each firm is optimising over its contract parameter, given the short run labour response described in the previous section.2 The labour market is perfectly competitive and all workers are fully employed. Of course no one believes that the classical stationary state is anything more than an abstraction. It is merely a useful way of describing the basic resource allocation patterns toward which an undisturbed market economy would tend in the very long run.
Perfect competition in the labour market of a long run stationary state must cause a law of one wage to prevail. The law of one wage is an abstraction of the idea that in the full employment equilibrium of an economy with many buyers and sellers of highly substitutable labour, no firm can get away with paying a compensation lower than the going rate.3 Let the prevailing equilibrium compensation be W*, which any single agent is too small to influence. I Perhaps the most convenient interpretation involves a situation with high natural turnover relative to economic change in each period. Then only the new workers applying for jobs need to vote with their feet. It is important to note that the basic results of the paper do not depend upon perfect labour mobility; without that assumption labour would presumably be allocated in the short run by some 'sticky' version of (21)- (25) which is analytically more messy but would not change any fundamental conclusions.
2 The underlying game theoretic description is the limiting Nash equilibrium with a very large number of firms, each of which follows an optimal compensation parameter strategy holding the strategies of the other firms constant.
3 '. . . there are strong reasons why the market in which a firm sells should normally be imperfectly competitive (for some individuality in its product is one of the bases on which a firm can maintain its own individuality). There is, however, no such reason why there should be " monopsony " on the buying side; it may occur, but its occurrence (one would think) would be relatively exceptional ... our standard picture of a firm should be such that it is a price-taker on the side of inputs, but a price-maker on the side of outputs.' J. R. Hicks Equilibrium condition (26) means that firm i maximises profits over all values of Ai and Lj, given that in equilibrium its workers must be compensated by as much as they could earn anywhere else. In principle, one could imagine a dynamic mechanism by which firm i gropes its way toward (At, L*) by experimenting with different values of Ai in the long run, then observes what amounts of labour Li can be retained in the short run, and finally discovers that Ai = At Li = Lt yields the greatest feasible profit. If (whether by union pressure or in a short sighted attempt to lure more labour) the firm were to set its compensation parameter Ai above At, it would soon find itself attracting more workers but making less profits.
Note that any long run equilibrium is a short run equilibrium, but not vice versa.
It turns out that, for the same underlying economy, the long run equilibria of all compensation systems are isomorphic to each other in the sense that a solution to any one system is a solution to any other. In the stationary state nothing of substance depends upon the choice of compensation system, which 1 Conditions (26)-(27) represent only a subset of long run general equilibrium conditions, not all of which are written out explicitly because they are not all relevant to the issues at hand. For example, the sum of wage income, rents, profits, etc. feeds back to constitute demand for products, a loop which is implicit in the definition of a revenue function but not stated explicitly. An unwritten condition (whether zero pure profits, or increasing returns, or some other barrier to entry) is preventing new firms from entering the market in equilibrium while simultaneously it is economical for existing firms to remain. The usual input-output relations are hidden behind demand and supply curves for intermediate materials. In principle the partial equilibrium demand for one firm's products includes the relevant reactions of other firms. It must be admitted that the present formulation sidesteps a number of unresolved, difficult, and even controversial issues involved in constructing a truly general equilibrium theory of monopolistic competition. In a sense the paper is concerned with the properties of a monopolistically competitive general equilibrium system given that it is meaningful to summarise the individual firm's market situation by a partial equilibrium net revenue product function. (Perhaps the simplest rigorous interpretation is of a country which exports everything it produces.) The reader who would like to verify that the conclusions of this paper are applicable to a complete closed-loop type model of a monopolistically competitive economy might try working out the details for the example presented in Weitzman (i 982). The relevant propositions in that context are: (i) a wage system can be in a neutrally stable rest state consistent with any level of unemployment; (2) for a share system the only possible rest state is at full employment and it is dynamically stable.
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COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 773 merely veils the underlying real economy. If an economy suddenly switched from one compensation system to another, no outside observer could tell the difference from the prices or quantities prevailing in a full employment stationary equilibrium. The same long run forces determine the same long run resource allocation patterns independently of the compensation system. With all compensation systems, the firm hires an equilibrium quantity of labour to the point where the marginal revenue product of an extra worker is equated to the prevailing wage W*. The intuition behind this result is the idea that, in long run equilibrium, any firm in any system ends up paying a money compensation no less than W* per worker. Therefore, the firm's reduced form equilibrium problem is just like the standard monopoly problem with money wage W*. Proposition i. All compensation systems have the same long run equilibria. Proof. It is implicitly being assumed that for any two compensation systems in general equilibrium the same pattern of labour incomes, rents, profits, etc., on the factor side would feed back to constitute the same spending patterns on the demand side, giving rise to identical revenue product functions for the firm. To prove that switching the compensation system will not alter an equilibrium state, therefore, it suffices to verify that a long run equilibrium is characterised by all firms hiring labour to the point where marginal revenue product equals the prevailing compensation irrespective of the ostensible form of the compensation function.
Under ordinary continuity conditions on demand and production, (26) is a well defined problem. Viewing lli defined by (I5) as a partial function of Ai given Li = L*, from (2) it is obvious that the profit maximising value of A in (26) must obey Wi (A-) L*P) = W*.
Since (29) By Proposition I, the stationary properties of all compensation systems are identical, so that one system is essentially the same as another in the long run. But the short run is another story altogether. The way in which factor payments are denominated can very much matter outside of long run equilibrium. There may be significant differences between the abilities of various systems to maintain full employment when disturbed by a disequilibrating shock. The proposition follows from applying (i I) and (I 3) to (34).
Equation (34) means that the share firm would find it profitable to expand production and hire more workers at the existing share parameter, if only it could locate more labour and if the going compensation constraint (28) could be disregarded. This is because when ( I) holds every additional worker lowers (marginally) the labour cost of the previously hired workers. In effect, the share firm can temporarily debase the currency in which its workers are paid by hiring more of them.
Proposition 2 implies that any share system in some sense equilibrates at strictly positive excess demand for labour. If the Walrasian auctioneer calls out equilibrium values of the compensation parameters {A*} and asks the firms how much labour they wish to hire, total demand for labour exceeds supply.
Positive excess demand for labour (plus continuity) means that a share system is essentially immune from involuntary unemployment after small shocks leave the compensation parameters quasi-fixed at 'wrong' values, because the firms find it unprofitable to lay off workers in the short run. A wage system does not have this property, because where (I 3) holds the system equilibrates in the long run at exactly zero excess demand for labour; a wage system responds to deflationary shocks by laying off workers in the short run whenever compensation parameters are quasi-fixed 'too high' relative to demand.1 THE BASIC RESULT Suppose a given compensation system is initially at complete rest in a hypothetical stationary state with the autonomous shift parameters semi-permanently fixed at some value A. Suddenly and unexpectedly A shifts slightly to a newvalue A + e for some small c. The compensation system is thrown into a temporary I A system of worker co-operatives, not treated in this paper, also equilibrates at zero excess demand for labour. (The worker co-operative differs from an ordinary firm in maximising not profits, but profits per member. For macroeconomic implications see, e.g. Vanek (I 970) , and the perceptive article of Meade (I979).) Note that a monopsonistic labour market might superficially appear to have similar properties to a share system; one important difference is that a monopsonistic wage increases, whereas a share compensation decreases, as more labour is hired in partial equilibrium.
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 775 state of (long run) disequilibrium. The methodology for analysing disequilibrium responses in this paper is to determine the short run temporary equilibrium reactions to small shocks in the neighbourhood of a long run stationary equilibrium position.' In effect the performance of alternative compensation systems is compared over a three period approximation to a dynamic adjustment path: ('old' long run equilibrium-temporary short run equilibrium-'new' long run equilibrium). Since at a very high level of abstraction (ignoring such issues as capital accumulation, multiple equilibria, and the like), all compensation systems can be regarded as starting from a common 'old' long run equilibrium and ending at a common 'new' long run equilibrium, at least as a crude approximation it suffices to focus on comparing short run properties. Proposition 3. A share system maintains full employment while reacting to small disturbances. A wage system responds to deflationary shocks by creating unemployment in the short run.
Proof. Given that all functions appearing throughout the paper are assumed smooth, Li(A), the unique interior solution to the optimisation problem (I6), must be continuous in A.
The distance function
@D(A) =-EL -(A) -S(A)) (35) is therefore continuous in A.
From Proposition 2 @D(A) > o,
for a share system, whereas
for a wage system. A deflationary shock is a change in A which decreases D (A). From continuity, even the smallest deflationary shock will be enough to make tD in (37) go negative. For D in (36), however, A is an interior point of the set {AI}(A) > o},
so that sufficiently small changes in A will not reverse the sign of (. I
Note that the excess demand function (35) is a direct measure of how much extra labour can be assimilated into a compensation system without causing unemployment. At least in principle, various compensation systems could be ranked by their short run abilities to absorb unemployed labour. I Note the underlying assumptions about timing. Employment decisions are made more frequently than contract revisions, and contracts are revised more often than the economy is hit by a major disturbance. It is important to bear in mind that the macroeconomic shocks treated in this paper represent uncertainty, not risk. Changes in A are caused by unanticipated, unforseen, unstable, nonrecurrent, non-stationary disturbances for which it is infeasible or too expensive to write insurance contracts. I do not believe it would be difficult to incorporate genuine risk into the model, nor would it substantially change the analysis (at least under symmetric information). All that would be required is to introduce an equilibrium corresponding to every well defined state of the world. Each such equilibrium would have the same properties as the single equilibrium analysed in this paper, only now every variable would be indexed by the appropriate state of the world. The issue of how such an economy reacts to unforseen shocks which take it out of long run equilibrium would remain substantially the same.
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[DECEMBER Generally speaking, the size of deflationary shock which can be absorbed without causing unemployment is dependent upon the number of share firms and the strength of each share firm's feedback loop connecting higher employment back to lower labour costs. In that sense, a compensation function has more desirable macroeconomic properties when the wage component is small relative to the share component and there is a high degree of excess demand for labour by the firm. If the fraction of all monopolistically competitive firms covered by meaningful share contracts is in some sense sufficiently large relative to the unemployment rate, the share firms should be able to lead the rest of the economy out of a recession.
A wage system (13) has the weakest possible unemployment absorption capacity among feasible systems because the excess demand for labour is precisely zero in equilibrium. A compensation system based on a feedback mechanism slightly to the other side of (I3) from (I I), i.e. ALj > 0) (39) could not exist in a state of long run equilibrium; any potential equilibrium is unstable because it would yield a negative excess demand for labour, causing firms to lay off werkers and the economy to contract. Wage systems have borderline employment stability properties, being a razor's edge of boundary points between stable and unstable regimes. An example is the compensation formula (12). The case of deterministic share contracts is interesting to analyse because it permits an especially sharp characterisation of the disequilibrium behaviour of each firm. In this section (alone) I assume that all firms have deterministic share contracts and that the uncertain disturbances influence only the net revenue product functions.
[DECEMBER competitive firms are aggressive on product markets, forever eager to find new customers and to sell more output at existing prices. The thesis of this paper is that the ultimate solution to stagflationist tendencies involves redesigning incentives so that firms are equally aggressive on the factor market side in the analogous sense of permanently seeking to hire more labour at existing compensation parameter values. The analysis of more complicated shocks is like the prototype example of a pure shift in labour supply. In each case the central feature is the same. A share economy equilibrates at positive excess demand for labour and, by continuity, remains at a level of positive excess demand even after undergoing a small disequilibrating shock. A wage economy equilibrates at zero excess demand for labour, and therefore does not exhibit any correspondingly strong short term tendency to absorb unemployed workers after a disturbance.
Consider, for example, how a share system automatically cushions first round deflationary demand shocks, even before existing compensation parameter rates can be changed. Suppose the demand for a firm's output declines. The share firm will react to a moderate leftward shift of the demand curve by trying to retain workers, maintain production, and lower prices. Workers may choose to quit if their pay is diminished below what could be obtained by them elsewhere (in the short run this could only happen under a non-deterministic contract), but they are never deliberately fired. Only if the decline in demand is sufficiently acute in one sector to reverse the positive excess demand for labour will firms there choose to lay off workers. But in principle any newly unemployed workers can find jobs in the less severely afflicted sectors of the economy which continue to want more labour. The basic point is that the positive excess demand for unemployed labour in the share system as a whole provides a safety margin for automatically reacting to changed conditions by maintaining full employment even out of equilibrium. The wage firm, on the other hand, reacts to a decline in demand by decreasing output and employment, with ambiguous effects on price (price is unchanged, for example, in the standard base case of constant marginal cost and a constant elasticity of demand). In both systems long run equilibrium is re-established only after a complicated adjustment of compensation parameters and a re-allocation of workers throughout the economy.
It is a common mistake to attribute the recession fighting qualities of a share system to a kind of surrogate wage flexibility which 'in effect' automatically maintains equilibrium. Both systems exhibit some friction or inflexibility of contract parameters. In principle a share system is no less disequilibrated by shocks than is a wage system. The point is rather that theform of disequilibrium response is different. Roughly speaking, the short term response of a share economy holds the quantity of hired labour (and output) at its full employment level, with the disequilibrium showing itself on the price (or value) side (workers are temporarily not paid their marginal revenue product). Wage economies, on the other hand, tend to respond to deflationary shocks by holding equilibrium prices (or values) in line (workers are always compensated their marginal revenue product) while the quantities of employment (and output) decline. In the long I983] ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 779 run both systems converge to the same equilibrium, but their short run behaviour is quite different.'
SOME WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
A basic tenet of this paper is the idea that, while wage and share systems have pretty much the same properties in stationary environments, a share system is more robust at handling well uncertain or unforseen events. In what welfare sense is the disequilibrium adjustment of a share system 'better' than the disequilibrium adjustment of a wage system? First of all, a share system tends to maintain full employment out of equilibrium. Low unemployment may legitimately be considered a desideratum in and of itself (even without the economist's pedantic summation of individual utility gains) because of its essential role in preserving the social fabric of a just democracy.
Full use of labour resources generally means more output.2 To the extent that we are prepared to rely on the compensation principle, a share system would have to be judged better because, with a bigger output pie, the winners could bribe the losers and still come out ahead.
Full employment also means that labour income is distributed more evenly across the working class population. That tendency is bound to help raise the value of a conventional social welfare function, even without going to the extreme of a Rawlsian formulation.
There is also a tendency3 for a share economy to pay out a higher total real income to labour than a wage economy after a recessionary shock. As Proposition 4 shows, this is clearly true for the case of deterministic contracts, since every worker in a depressed share economy is retained by his firm at the same pay while some of his counterparts in the wage economy are being laid off. As another example, consider the case of a pure product wage or revenue sharing with output proportional to labour. In a money wage system the employment level fluctuates while money pay per employed worker is constant. In a product wage or revenue sharing system, employment is steady while money pay varies. Since the monopolistically competitive firm must have an elasticity of demand greater than one in equilibrium, when demand is depressed the firms pay out more money to 1 The situation is reminiscent of a 'prices vs. quantities' comparison (see Weitzman (1974) , especially section V). If most uncertainty is in the form of independent firm-specific shocks, with the overall level of aggregate demand more or less stable, a wage system offers fine efficiency and welfare properties. But when the level of aggregate demand is the major source of uncertainty, so that shocks to the different firms are highly correlated, a system which stabilises quantities has the comparative advantage in performance. Viewed in this context, the primary contribution of the present paper lies in showing that a share system possesses strong quantity stabilising properties.
2 I am leaving aside pathological cases of such unlikely inefficiency as to conceivably reverse this conclusion.
3 Counter examples are possible, but the reader who wishes to try can verify that one has to strain to concoct them. Note that the present paper concentrates on the direct first order employment effects of alternative compensation systems, abstracting away from secondary or distributional aspects involving risk-bearing, effort, incentives, and the like. More comprehensive models are certainly possible, and should eventually be constructed, but I believe the present approach captures the most basic issues in a reasonably simple fashion.
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[DECEMBER labour (and note that profits are also higher) under a product wage system than under a money wage system.' All of this begs an important question. If a share system possesses superior qualities, why don't we see more examples of it? A traditional answer might stress the powerful forces of history, custom, and inertia. A more theoretical answer is that share contracts exhibit strong externality effects. When a wage firm converts to a share contract most of the benefits accrue not to its own workers, but to the working class as a whole.
To see the argument most clearly, consider the case of deterministic contracts. As Proposition 4 vividly demonstrates, the driving force behind full employment in a share system is not the actual lowering of pay during a recessionary shock, but rather the potential loweringwhich would occur if more workers could be hired. So long as all firms use share contracts there will not be any free floating unemployed labour available for a particular share firm to hire at decreased pay, and in the short run no worker's compensation will actually be lowered by a deflationary shock.
That part changes when the share firms constitute a small minority. If one firm in a wage system goes over to a share contract, it will be guaranteeing full employment to its own workers and serving as the employer of last resort for all the others. In bad times the one share firm will be absorbing unemployed labour shed by the depressed wage firms (this is the externality), thereby lowering the pay of its original workers, possibly to the point where they might well prefer to keep a wage contract and take a chance on uncertain employment. If all wage firms go over to a share system, every worker benefits from the resulting tight labour market. But it is not clear (it depends on the particular case) whether or not the already employed workers of an existing wage firm benefit if that firm alone converts to a share contract. The essence of the externality is that in choosing a particular contract form, the firm and its workers do not take into account the macroeconomic implications.2
INFLATION
Because a share system offers lower unemployment, the reasonable presumption might be that it is inherently more inflationary than a wage system. Here I merely want to cast doubt on this presumption by suggesting some reasons for believing the reverse proposition: a share economy should have more of an anti-inflationary bias than the corresponding wage economy. Without money or financial claims
